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Abstract: The security of lattice-based cryptosystems such as NTRU, GGH and Ajtai-Dwork essen-
tially relies upon the intractability of computing a shortest non-zero lattice vector and a closest lattice
vector to a given target vector in high dimensions. The best algorithms for these tasks are due to Kan-
nan, and, though remarkably simple, their complexity estimates have not been improved since more
than twenty years. Kannan’s algorithm for solving the shortest vector problem is in particular crucial
in Schnorr’s celebrated block reduction algorithm, on which are based the best known attacks against
the lattice-based encryption schemes mentioned above. Understanding precisely Kannan’s algorithm
is of prime importance for providing meaningful key-sizes.In this paper we improve the complexity
analyses of Kannan’s algorithms and discuss the possibility of improving the underlying enumeration
strategy.
Key-words: Lattice reduction, complexity analysis, lattice-based cryptosystems.
⋆ CNRS and École Normale Supérieure de Lyon, LIP, 46 allée d’Italie, 69007 Lyon, France.
Amélioration de l’analyse de l’algorithme de Kannan pour leproblème
du vecteur le plus court
Résumé : La sécurité des cryptosystèmes basés sur les réseaux, tels NTRU, GGH, ou encore Ajtai-
Dwork, repose essentiellement sur la difficulté à calculer un vecteur non nul le plus court, ou le plus
proche d’un vecteur cible donné, en grande dimension. Les meilleurs algorithmes pour accomplir ces
tâches sont dus à Kannan, et, en dépit de leur grande simplicité, l’analyse de leur complexité n’a pas été
améliorée depuis plus de 20 ans. L’algorithme de Kannan pourrésoudre le problème du vecteur le plus
court est particulièrement critique dans le célèbre algorithme de Schnorr pour la réduction par blocs,
sur lequel sont basées les meilleures attaques contre les schémas de chiffrement utilisant les réseaux
mentionnées précédemment. Comprendre précisément la complexité de l’algorithme de Kannan est
donc crucial pour déterminer des tailles de clé pertinentes. Dans ce travail, nous améliorons les
analyses de complexité des algorithmes de Kannan, et discutons la possibilité d’améliorer la stratégie
d’énumération sous-jacente.
Mots-clés : Réduction des réseaux, analyse de complexité, cryptosystème basés sur les réseaux
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1 Introduction
A lattice L is a discrete subgroup of someRn. Such an object can always be represented as the set
of integer linear combinations of no more thann vectorsb1, . . . , bd. If these vectors are linearly
independent, we say that they are a basis of the latticeL. The most famous algorithmic problem
associated with lattices is the so-called Shortest Vector Pr blem (SVP). Its computational variant is
to find a non-zero lattice vector of smallest Euclidean length — this length being the minimumλ(L)
of the lattice — given a basis of the lattice. Its decisional vriant is known to be NP-hard under
randomised reductions [2], even if one only asks for a vectorwhose length is no more than2(log d)
1−ǫ
times the length of a shortest vector [12] (for anyǫ > 0).
SVP is of prime importance in cryptography since a now quite large family of public-key cryp-
tosystems rely more or less on it. The Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [4] relies ondc-SVP for somec > 0,
wheref(d)-SVP is the problem of finding the shortest non-zero vector inthe latticeL, knowing
that it is unique in the sense that any vector that is of lengthless thanf(d) · λ(L) is parallel to it.
The GGH cryptosystem [11] relies on special instances of theClosest Vector Problem (CVP), a non-
homogeneous version of SVP. Finally, one strongly suspectsthat in NTRU [15] – the only realistic
lattice-based cryptosystem nowadays, the private key can be read on the coordinates of a shortest
vector of the Coppersmith-Shamir lattice [8]. The best knowgeneric attacks on these encryption
schemes are based on solving SVP. It is therefore highly important to know precisely what complex-
ity is achievable, both in theory and practice, in particular to select meaningful key-sizes.
In practice, when one wants to obtain good approximations ofthe lattice minimum, one uses
Schnorr’s block-based algorithms [23,24]. These algorithms use internally either Kannan’s algorithm,
or the lattice point enumeration procedure on which it relies. This is by far the most time-consuming
part of these algorithms. In fact, the corresponding routine in Shoup’s NTL [25] relies on a much
slower algorithm described in [24] (2O(d
2) instead ofdO(d)). The problem is that the enumeration is
performed on a basis which is not sufficiently pre-processed(only LLL-reduced). It works well in
low dimension, but it can be checked that it is sub-optimal even in moderate dimensions (say 40):
the efficiency gap between enumerating from an LLL-reduced basis and from an HKZ-reduced basis
shows that there is much room for improving the strategy of [24] by pre-processing the basis before
starting the enumeration.
Two main algorithms are known for solving SVP. The first one, which is deterministic, is based on
the exhaustive enumeration of lattice points within a smallconvex set. It is known as Fincke-Pohst’s
enumeration algorithm [9] in the algorithmic number theorycommunity. In the cryptography commu-
nity, it is known as Kannan’s algorithm [16], which is quite similar to the one of Fincke and Pohst.
There are two main differences between both: firstly, in Kannan’s algorithm, a long pre-computation
on the basis is performed before starting the enumeration process; secondly, Kannan enumerates points
in a hyper-parallelepiped whereas Fincke and Pohst do it in an hyper-ellipsoid contained in Kannan’s
hyper-parallelepiped – though it may be that Kannan chose the hyper-parallelepiped in order to sim-
plify the complexity analysis. Kannan obtained add+o(d) complexity bound (in all the complexity
bounds mentioned in the introduction, there is an implicit multiplicative factor that is polynomial in
the bit-size of the input). In 1985, Helfrich [13] refined Kannan’s analysis, and obtained add/2+o(d)
complexity bound. On the other hand, Ajtai, Kumar and Sivakumar [5] described a probabilistic al-
gorithm of complexity2O(d). The best exponent constant is likely to be small. Nevertheless, unless a
breakthrough modification is introduced, this algorithm isbound to remain impractical even in moder-
ate dimension since it also requires an exponential space (at least2d in dimensiond). On the contrary,
the deterministic algorithm of Kannan requires a polynomial space.
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Our main result is to lower Helfrich’s complexity bound on Kannan’s algorithm, fromd
d
2
+o(d) ≈
d0.5·d to d
d
2e
+o(d) ≈ d0.184·d+o(d). This may explain why Kannan’s algorithm is tractable even in
moderate dimensions (higher than40). Our analysis can also be adapted to Kannan’s algorithm that
solves the Closest Vector Problem: it decreases Helfrich’scomplexity bound fromdd+o(d) todd/2+o(d).
The complexity improvement on Kannan’s SVP algorithm directly provides better worst-case effi-
ciency/quality trade-offs in Schnorr’s block-based algorithms [23,24,10].
It must be noted that if one follows our analysis step by step,he derivedo(d) may be large
when evaluated for some practicald: the constants hidden in the “o(d)” are improvable (for some of
them it may be easy, for others it is probably much harder). Noeff rt was made to improve them,
and we believe that it would have complicated the proof with irrelevant details. In fact, most of our
analysis consists of estimating the number of lattice points wi hin convex bodies, and showing that the
approximation by the volume is valid. By replacing this discretization by heuristic volume estimates,
one obtains very small heuristic hidden constants.
Our complexity improvement is based on a fairly simple idea.It is equivalent to generate all lattice
points within a ball and to generate all integer points within an ellipsoid (consider the ellipsoid defined
by the quadratic form naturally associated with the given lattice basis). Fincke and Pohst noticed that
it was more efficient to work with the ellipsoid than to consider a parallelepiped containing it: indeed,
when the dimension increases, the ratio of the two volumes shrinks to0 very quickly. Amazingly, in his
analysis, instead of considering the ellipsoid, Kannan bounds the volume of the parallelepiped. Using
rather involved technicalities, we bound the volume of the ellipsoid (in fact, the number of integer
points within it). Some parts of our proof could be of independ t interest. For example, we show that
for any Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev-reduced (HKZ-reducedfor short) lattice basis(b1, . . . , bd), and
any subsetI of {1, . . . , d}, we have:
‖b1‖|I|
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
≤
√
d
|I|
(
1+log d
|I|
)
,
where(b∗i )i≤d is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation of the basis(b1, . . . , bd). This inequality gen-
eralises the results of [23] on the quality of HKZ-reduced bases.
ROAD-MAP OF THE PAPER. In Section 2, we recall some basic definitions and properties on lattice
reduction. Section 3 is devoted to the description of Kannan’s lgorithm and Section 4 to its complex-
ity analysis. In Section 5, we give without much detail our sibling result on CVP, as well as very direct
consequences of our result for Schnorr’s block-based algorithms.
NOTATION. All logarithms are natural logarithms, i.e.,log(e) = 1. Let‖ · ‖ and〈·, ·〉 be the Euclidean
norm and inner product ofRn. Bold variables are vectors. We use the bit complexity model. The
notationP(n1, . . . , ni) means(n1 · . . . · ni)c for some constantc > 0. If x is real, we denote by⌊x⌉
a closest integer to it (with any convention for making it unique) and we define the centred fractional
part{x} asx − ⌊x⌉. We use the notation frac(x) to denote the classical fractional part ofx, i.e., the
quantityx− ⌊x⌋. Finally, for any integersa andb, we defineJa, bK as[a, b] ∩ Z.
2 Background on Lattice Reduction
We assume the reader is familiar with the geometry of numbersand its algorithmic aspects. Complete
introductions to Euclidean lattices algorithmic problemscan be found in [20] and [22].
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation. Let b1, . . . , bd be linearly independent vectors. TheirGram-
Schmidt orthogonalisation(GSO)b∗1, . . . , b
∗
d is the orthogonal family defined recursively as follows:
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the vectorb∗i is the component of the vectorbi which is orthogonal to the linear span of the vec-
torsb1, . . . , bi−1. We haveb∗i = bi −
∑i−1
j=1 µi,jb
∗
j whereµi,j =
〈bi,b∗j 〉
‖b∗j‖2
. For i ≤ d we letµi,i = 1.
Notice that the GSO family depends on the order of the vectors. If thebi’s are integer vectors, theb∗i ’s
and theµi,j ’s are rational.
Lattice volume. The volume of a latticeL is defined asdet(L) =
∏d
i=1 ‖b∗i ‖, where thebi’s are any
basis ofL. It does not depend on the choice of the basis ofL and can be interpreted as the geometric
volume of the parallelepiped naturally spanned by the basisvectors.
Minimum and SVP. Another important lattice invariant is the minimum. Theminimumλ(L) is the
radius of the smallest closed ball centred at the origin containing at least one non-zero lattice vec-
tor. The most famous lattice problem is theshortest vector problem. We give here its computational
variant: given a basis of a latticeL, find a lattice vector whose norm is exactlyλ(L).
CVP. We give here the computational variant of theclosest vector problem: given a basis of a latticeL
and a target vector in the real span ofL, find a closest vector ofL to the target vector.
The volume and the minimum of a lattice cannot behave independently. Hermite [14] was the
first to bound the ratio λ(L)
(det L)1/d
as a function of the dimension only, but his bound was later on
greatly improved by Minkowski in hisGeometrie der Zahlen[21]. Hermite’s constantγd is defined
as the supremum overd dimensional latticesL of the ratio λ(L)
2
(det L)2/d
. In particular, we haveγd ≤ d+44
(see [18]), which we will refer to asMinkowski’s theorem. Unfortunately, the proof of Minkowski’s
theorem is not constructive. In practice, one often starts wi h a lattice basis, and tries to improve its
quality. This process is called lattice reduction. The mostusual ones are probably the LLL and HKZ
reductions. Before defining them, we need the concept of size-reduction.
Size-reduction. A basis (b1, . . . , bd) is size-reducedif its GSO family satisfies|µi,j| ≤ 1/2 for
all 1 ≤ j < i ≤ d.
HKZ-reduction. A basis(b1, . . . , bd) is said to beHermite-Korkine-Zolotarev-reducedif it is size-
reduced, the vectorb1 reaches the first lattice minimum, and the projections of the(bi)i≥2’s orthog-
onally to the vectorb1 are an HKZ-reduced basis. The following immediately follows from this def-
inition and Minkowski’s theorem. It is the sole property on HKZ-reduced bases that we will use:
Lemma 1. If (b1, . . . , bd) is HKZ-reduced, then for anyi ≤ d, we have:
‖b∗i ‖ ≤
√
d− i + 5
4
·


∏
j≥i
‖b∗j‖


1
d−i+1
.
HKZ-reduction is very strong, but very expensive to compute. On the contrary, LLL-reduction is
fairly cheap, but an LLL-reduced basis is of much lower quality.
LLL-reduction [17]. A basis(b1, . . . , bd) is LLL-reducedif it is size-reduced and if its GSO satisfies
the(d− 1) Lovász conditions:34 ·
∥
∥b
∗
κ−1
∥
∥
2 ≤
∥
∥b
∗
κ + µκ,κ−1b
∗
κ−1
∥
∥
2
. The LLL-reduction implies that
the norms‖b∗1‖, . . . , ‖b∗d‖ of the GSO vectors never drop too fast: intuitively, the vectors are not far
from being orthogonal. Such bases have useful properties, lik providing exponential approximations
to SVP and CVP. In particular, their first vector is relatively short. More precisely:
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Theorem 1 ([17]).Let (b1, . . . , bd) be an LLL-reduced basis of a latticeL. Then we have‖b1‖ ≤
2
d−1
4 · (det L)1/d. Moreover, there exists an algorithm that takes as input anyset of integer vectors
and outputs in deterministic polynomial time an LLL-reduced basis of the lattice they span.
In the following, we will also need the fact that if the set of vectors given as input to the LLL
algorithm starts with a shortest non-zero lattice vector, then this vector is not changed during the
execution of the algorithm: the output basis starts with thesame vector.
3 Kannan’s SVP Algorithm
Kannan’s SVP algorithm [16] relies on multiple calls to the so-called short lattice points enumeration
procedure. The latter aims at computing all vectors of a given lattice that are in the hyper-sphere
centred in0 and some prescribed radius. Variants of the enumeration procedure are described in [1].
3.1 Short Lattice Points Enumeration
Let (b1, . . . , bd) be a basis of a latticeL ⊂ Zn and letA ∈ Z. Our goal is to find all lattice
vectors
∑d
i=1 xibi of squared Euclidean norm≤ A. The enumeration works as follows. Suppose
that ‖∑i xibi‖
2 ≤ A for some integersxi’s. Then, by considering the components of the vec-
tor
∑
i xibi on each of theb
∗
i ’s, we obtain:
(xd)
2 · ‖b∗d‖2 ≤ A,
(xd−1 + µd,d−1xd)
2 · ‖b∗d−1‖2 ≤ A− (xd)2 · ‖b∗d‖2,
. . .

xi +
d
∑
j=i+1
µj,ixj


2
· ‖b∗i ‖2 ≤ A−
d
∑
j=i+1
lj ,
. . .

x1 +
d
∑
j=2
µj,ixj


2
· ‖b1‖2 ≤ A−
d
∑
j=2
lj ,
whereli = (xi +
∑
j>i xjµj,i)
2 · ‖b∗i ‖2. The algorithm of Figure 1 mimics the equations above. It
is easy to see that the bit-cost of this algorithm is bounded by the number of loop iterations times a
polynomial in the bit-size of the input. We will prove that ifthe input basis(b1, . . . , bd) is sufficiently
reduced and ifA = ‖b1‖2, then the number of loop iterations isd
d
2e
+o(d).
3.2 Solving SVP
To solve SVP, Kannan provides an algorithm that computes HKZ-reduced bases, see Figure 2. The
cost of the enumeration procedure dominates the overall cost and mostly depends on the quality (i.e.,
the slow decrease of the‖b∗i ‖’s) of the input basis. The main idea of Kannan’s algorithm isthus to
spend a lot of time pre-computing a basis of excellent quality before calling the enumeration proce-
dure. More precisely, it pre-computes a basis which satisfies th following definition:
Definition 1 (Quasi-HKZ-Reduction). A basis(b1, . . . , bd) is quasi-HKZ-reduced if it is size-red-
uced, if‖b∗2‖ ≥ ‖b∗1‖/2 and if once projected orthogonally tob1, the otherbi’s are HKZ-reduced.
INRIA
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Input: An integral lattice basis(b1, . . . , bd), a boundA ∈ Z.
Output: All vectors inL(b1, . . . , bd) that are of squared norm≤ A.
1. Compute the rationalµi,j ’s and‖b∗i ‖
2’s.
2. x:=0, l:=0, S:=∅.
3. i:=1. While i ≤ d, do
4. li:=(xi +
∑
j>i xjµj,i)
2‖b∗i ‖
2.
5. If i = 1 and
∑d
j=1 lj ≤ A, thenS:=S ∪ {x}, x1:=x1 + 1.
6. If i 6= 1 and
∑
j≥i lj ≤ A, then
7. i:=i − 1, xi:=
⌈
−
∑
j>i(xjµj,i) −
√
A−
∑
j>i lj
‖b∗
i
‖2
⌉
.
8. If
∑
j≥i lj > A, theni:=i + 1, xi:=xi + 1.
9. ReturnS.
Fig. 1. The Enumeration Algorithm.
Input: An integer lattice basis(b1, . . . , bd).
Output: An HKZ-reduced basis of the same lattice.
1. LLL-reduce the basis(b1, . . . , bd).
2. Do
3. Compute the projections(b′i)i≥2 of thebi’s orthogonally tob1.
4. HKZ-reduce the(d − 1)-dimensional basis(b′2, . . . , b
′
d).
5. Extend the obtained(b′i)i≥2’s into vectors ofL by adding to them rational
multiples ofb1, in such a way that we have|µi,1| ≤ 1/2 for anyi > 1.
6. While(b1, . . . , bd) is not quasi-HKZ-reduced.
7. Call the enumeration procedure to find all lattice vectorsof length≤ ‖b1‖.
Let b0 be a shortest non-zero vector among them.
8. (b1, . . . , bd):=LLL (b0, . . . , bd).
9. Compute the projections(b′i)i≥2’s of thebi’s orthogonally to the vectorb1.
10. HKZ-reduce the(d − 1)-dimensional basis(b′2, . . . , b
′
d).
11. Extend the obtained(b′i)i≥2’s into vectors ofL by adding to them rational
multiples ofb1, in such a way that we have|µi,1| ≤ 1/2 for anyi > 1.
Fig. 2. Kannan’s SVP Algorithm.
RR n° 6186
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Several comments need to be made on the algorithm of Figure 2.Steps 4 and 10 are recursive
calls. Nevertheless, one should be careful because theb′i’s are rational vectors, whereas the input of the
algorithm must be integral. One must therefore scale the vectors by a common factor. Steps 5 and 11
can be performed for example by expressing the reduced basisvectors as integer linear combinations
of the initial ones, using these coefficients to recover lattice vectors and subtracting a correct multiple
of the vectorb1. In Step 7, it is alway possible to choose such a vectorb0, since this enumeration
always provides non-zero solutions (the vectorb1 is a one of them).
3.3 Cost of Kannan’s SVP Solver
We recall briefly Helfrich’s complexity analysis [13] of Kannan’s algorithm and explain our com-
plexity improvement. LetC(d, n,B) be the worst-case complexity of the algorithm of Figure 2 when
given as input ad-dimensional basis which is embedded inZn and whose coefficients are smaller
thanB in absolute value. Kannan [16] and Helfrich [13] show the following properties:
– It computes an HKZ-reduced basis of the lattice spanned by the input vectors.
– All arithmetic operations performed during the execution are of costP(d, n, log B). This implies
that the costC(d, n,B) can be bounded byC(d) · P(log B,n) for some functionC(d).
– The number of iterations of the loop of Steps 2–6 is bounded byO(1) + log d.
– The cost of the call to the enumeration procedure at Step 7 is bounded byP(log B,n) · dd/2+o(d).
From these properties and those of the LLL algorithm as recalled in the previous section, it is easy
to obtain the following equation:
C(d) ≤ (O(1) + log d)(C(d− 1) + P(d)) + P(d) + d d2+o(d).
One can then derive the boundC(d,B, n) ≤ P(log B,n) · d d2+o(d).
The main result of this paper is to improve this complexity upper bound toP(log B,n) ·d d2e +o(d).
In fact, we show the following:
Theorem 2. Given as inputs a quasi-HKZ-reduced basis(b1, . . . , bd) andA = ‖b1‖2, the number of
loop iterations during the execution of the enumeration algorithm as described in Figure 1 is bounded
by P(log B) · 2O(d) · d d2e , whereB = maxi ‖bi‖. As a consequence, given ad-dimensional basis
of n-dimensional vectors whose entries are integers with absolute values≤ B, one can compute an
HKZ-reduced basis of the lattice they span in deterministictimeP(log B,n) · d d2e+o(d).
4 Complexity of the Enumeration Procedure
This section is devoted to proving Theorem 2.
4.1 From the Enumeration Procedure to Integer Points in Hyper-ellipsoids
In this subsection, we do not assume anything on the input basis (b1, . . . , bd) and on the input
boundA. Up to some polynomial ind and log B, the complexity of the enumeration procedure of
Figure 1 is the number of loop iterations. This number of iterations is itself bounded by:
d
∑
i=1
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣



(xi, . . . , xd) ∈ Zd−i+1, ‖
d
∑
j=i
xjb
(i)
j ‖2 ≤ A



∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
,
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whereb(i)j = bj −
∑
k<i µj,kb
∗
k is the vectorbj once projected orthogonally to the linear span of
the vectorsb1, . . . , bi−1. Indeed, the truncated coordinate(xi, . . . , xd) is either a valid one, i.e., we
have|∑dj=i xjb
(i)
j ‖2 ≤ A, or (xi − 1, . . . , xd) is a valid one, or(xi+1, . . . , xd) is a valid one. In fact,
if (xi, . . . , xd) is a valid truncated coordinate, only two non-valid ones related to that one can possibly
be considered during the execution of the algorithm:(xi + 1, . . . , xd) and (xi−1, xi . . . , xd) for at
most one integerxi−1.
Consider the quantity
∣
∣
∣
{
(xi, . . . , xd) ∈ Zd−i+1, ‖
∑d
j=i xjb
(i)
j ‖2 ≤ A
}∣
∣
∣
. By applying the change
of variablexj ← xj −
⌊
∑
k>j µk,jxk
⌉
, we obtain:
∑
i≤d
|{(xi, . . . , xd) ∈ Zd−i+1 , ‖
∑
j≥i
xjb
(i)
j ‖2 ≤ A}|
≤
∑
i≤d
|{(xi, . . . , xd) ∈ Zd−i+1,
∑
j≥i
(xj +
∑
k>j
µk,jxk)
2 · ‖b∗j‖2 ≤ A}|
≤
∑
i≤d
|{(xi, . . . , xd) ∈ Zd−i+1,
∑
j≥i
(xj + {
∑
k>j
µk,jxk })2 · ‖b∗j‖2 ≤ A}|.
If x is an integer andǫ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2], then we have the relation(x + ǫ)2 ≥ x2/4. If x = 0,
this is obvious, and otherwise we use the inequality|ǫ| ≤ 1/2 ≤ |x|/2. As a consequence, up to a
polynomial factor, the complexity of the enumeration is bounded by:
∑
i≤d
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣



(xi, . . . , xd) ∈ Zd−i+1,
∑
j≥i
x2j · ‖b∗j‖2 ≤ 4A



∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
.
For anyi ≤ d, we define the ellipsoidEi =
{
(yi, . . . , yd) ∈ Rd−i+1,
∑
j≥i y
2
j · ‖b∗j‖2 ≤ 4A
}
, as
well as the quantityNi = |Ei ∩ Zd−i+1|. We want to bound the sum of theNi’s. We now fix some
indexi. The following sequence of relations is inspired from [19, Lemma 1].
Ni =
∑
(xi,...,xd)∈Zd−i+1
1Ei(xi, . . . , xd) ≤ exp

d

1−
∑
j≥i
x2j
‖b∗j‖2
4A




≤ ed ·
∏
j≥i
∑
x∈Z
exp
(
−x2 d‖b
∗
i ‖2
4A
)
= ed ·
∏
j≥i
Θ
(
d‖b∗j‖2
4A
)
,
whereΘ(t) =
∑
x∈Z exp(−tx2) is defined fort > 0. Notice thatΘ(t) = 1 + 2
∑
x≥1 exp(−tx2) ≤
1 + 2
∫∞
0 exp(−tx2)dx = 1 +
√
π
t . HenceΘ(t) ≤
1+
√
π√
t
for t ≤ 1 andΘ(t) ≤ 1 +√π for t ≥ 1.
As a consequence, we have:
Ni ≤ (4e(1 +
√
π))d ·
∏
j≥i
max
(
1,
√
A√
d‖b∗i ‖
)
. (1)
One thus concludes that the cost of the enumeration procedure is bounded by:
P(n, log A, log B) · 2O(d) · max
I⊂J1,dK
(
(
√
A)|I|
(
√
d)|I|
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
)
.
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4.2 The Case of Quasi-HKZ-Reduced Bases
We know suppose thatA = ‖b1‖2 and that the input basis(b1, . . . , bd) is quasi-HKZ-reduced. Our
first step is to strengthen the quasi-HKZ-reducedness hypotesis to an HKZ-reducedness hypothesis.
Let I ⊂ J1, dK. If 1 /∈ I, then, because of the quasi-HKZ-reducedness assumption:
‖b1‖|I|
(
√
d)|I|
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
≤ 2d ‖b
∗
2‖|I|
(
√
d)|I|
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
.
Otherwise if1 ∈ I, then we have, by removing‖b∗1‖ from the product
∏
i∈I−{1} ‖b∗i ‖:
‖b1‖|I|
(
√
d)|I|
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
≤ 2d ‖b
∗
2‖|I|−1
(
√
d)|I|−1
∏
i∈I−{1} ‖b∗i ‖
.
As a consequence, in order to obtain Theorem 2, it suffices to prove the following:
Theorem 3. Letb1, . . . , bd be an HKZ-reduced basis. LetI ⊂ J1, dK. Then,
‖b1‖|I|
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
≤ (
√
d)
|I|
(
1+log d
|I|
)
≤ (
√
d)
d
e
+|I|.
4.3 A Property on the Geometry of HKZ-Reduced Bases
In this section, we prove Theorem 3, which is the last missingpart to obtain the announced result.
Some parts of the proof are fairly technical and have been postponed to the appendix (this is the
case for the proofs of Lemmata 2–5). As a guide, the reader should c nsider the typical case where
(bi)1≤i≤d is an HKZ-reduced basis for which(‖b∗i ‖)i is a non-increasing sequence. In that case, the
shape of the intervalI that is provided by Equation(1) is much simpler: it is an interval Ji, dK starting
at some indexi. Lemmata 4 and 2 (which should thus be considered as the core of th proof) and the
fact thatx log x ≥ −1/e for x ∈ [0, 1] are sufficient to deal with such simple intervals, and thus to
provide the result.
The difficulties arise when the shape of the setI under study becomes more complicated. Though
the proof is technically quite involved, the strategy itself can be summed up in a few words. We
split our HKZ-reduced basis intoblocks(defined by the expression ofI as a union of intervals), i.e.,
groups of consecutive vectorsbi, bi+1, . . . , bj−1 such thati, . . . , k − 1 6∈ I andk, . . . , j − 1 ∈ I. The
former vectors will be the “large ones”, and the latter the “small ones”. Over each block, Lemma 4
relates the average size of the small vectors to the average size of the whole block. We consider the
blocks by decreasing indices (in Lemma 6), and use an amortised analysis to combine finely the local
behaviours on blocks to obtain a global bound. This recombinatio is extremely tight, and in order to
get the desired bound we use “parts of vectors” (non-integral powers of them). This is why we need to
introduce thẽπ (in Definition 3). A final convexity argument provided by Lemma 3 gives the result.
In the sequel,(bi)1≤i≤d is an HKZ-reduced basis of a latticeL of dimensiond ≥ 2.
Definition 2. For any I ⊂ J1, dK, we defineπI =
(
∏
i∈I ‖b∗i ‖
) 1
|I| . Moreover, ifk ∈ J1, d− 1K, we
defineΓd(k) =
∏d−1
i=d−k γ
1
2i
i+1.
For technical purposes in the proof of Lemma 6, we also need thfollowing definition.
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Definition 3. If 1 ≤ a < b ≤ d, wherea is real andb is an integer, we define:
π̃[a,b] =

‖b∗⌊a⌋‖1−a+⌊a⌋ ·
b
∏
i=⌊a⌋+1
‖b∗i ‖


1
b+1−a
=
(
πJ⌊a⌋,bK
)
(b+1−⌊a⌋)(1−a+⌊a⌋)
b+1−a ·
(
πJ⌊a⌋+1,bK
)
(b−⌊a⌋)(a−⌊a⌋)
b+1−a .
Note that Definition 3 naturally extends Definition 2, sinceπ̃[a,b] = πJa,bK whena is an integer.
We need estimates on the order of magnitude ofΓ , and a technical lemma allowing us to recom-
bine such estimates. Basically, the following lemma is a precise version of the identity:
log Γd(k) ≈
∫ d
x=d−k
x
2
log xdx ≈ log
2(d) − log2(d− k)
4
<∼
log d
2
log
d
d− k .
Lemma 2. For all 1 ≤ k < d, we haveΓd(k) ≤
√
d
log d
d−k .
The following lemma derives from the convexity of the function x 7→ x log x.
Lemma 3. Let ∆ ≥ 1, and defineF∆(k, d) = ∆−k log
k
d . We have, for all integert, for all inte-
gersk1, . . . , kt andd1, . . . , dt such that1 ≤ ki < di for all i ≤ t,
∏
i≤t
F∆(ki, di) ≤ F∆


∑
i≤t
ki,
∑
i≤t
di

 .
We now give an “averaged” version of [23, Lemma 4]. For completen ss, we give its proof in
appendix. This provides the result claimed in Theorem 3 for any intervalI = Ji, jK, for anyi ≤ j ≤ d.
Lemma 4. For all k ∈ J0, d − 1K, we have
πJ1,kK ≤ (Γd(k))d/k · πJk+1,dK and πJk+1,dK ≥ (Γd(k))−1 · (det L)1/d ≥
√
d
log d−k
d (detL)1/d.
The following lemma extends Lemma 4 to the case wherek is not necessarily an integer. Its proof
is conceptually simple, but involves rather heavy elementary c lculus. It would be simpler to obtain
it with a relaxation factor. The result is nevertheless worth the effort since the shape of the bound is
extremely tractable in the sequel.
Lemma 5. If 1 ≤ x1 < x2 < d are real and in[1, d), thenπ̃[x2,d] ≥
√
d
log
d−x2
d−x1 · π̃[x1,d].
We prove Theorem 3 by induction on the number of intervals occurring in the expression of the
setI as a union of intervals. The following lemma is the inductionstep. This is a recombination step,
where we join one block (between the indices1 andv, the “small vectors” being those betweenu + 1
andv) to one or more already considered blocks on its right. An important point is to ensure that the
densitiesδi defined below actually decrease.
Lemma 6. Let (b1, . . . , bd) be an HKZ-reduced basis. Letv ∈ J2, dK, I ⊂ Jv + 1, dK andu ∈ J1, vK.
Assume that:
π
|I|
I ≥
∏
i<t
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
·
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
,
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whereIi = I ∩ Jαi + 1, αi+1K , δi = |Ii|αi+1−αi is the density ofI in Jαi + 1, αi+1K, and the integerst
and αi’s, and the densitiesδi satisfyt ≥ 1, v = α1 < α2 < . . . < αt ≤ d and 1 ≥ δ1 > . . . >
δt−1 > 0.
Then, we have
π
|I′|
I′ ≥
∏
i<t′
(
π
|I′i|
Jα′i+1,α′i+1K ·
√
d
|I′i| log δ′i
)
,
whereI ′ = Ju + 1, vK ∪ I, I ′i = I ′ ∩
q
α′i + 1, α
′
i+1
y
, δ′i =
|I′i|
α′i+1−α′i
and the integerst′ andα′i’s, and
the densitiesδ′i satisfyt
′ ≥ 1, 0 = α′1 < α′2 < . . . < α′t′ ≤ d and1 ≥ δ′1 > . . . > δ′t′−1 > 0.
Proof. Assume first thatv−uv ≥ δ1, Then, thanks to Lemma 4,
π
|I′|
I′ = π
v−u
Ju+1,vK · π
|I|
I ≥ πv−uJ1,vK ·
√
d
(v−u) v−u
v · π|I|I ,
we are done witht′ = t + 1, α′1 = 1, α
′
k = αk−1, δ
′
1 =
v−u
v , δ
′
k = δk−1.
Otherwise, we letλ1 > 0 be such thatv−uv−λ1 = δ1 =
v−u+|I1|
α2−λ1 , where the first equality definesλ1
and the second one follows. Note that this implies:
π̃v−u[λ1,v] · π
|I1|
Jv+1,α2K
= π̃
v−u+|I1|
[λ1,α2]
.
Then, we have, by using Lemma 5,
π
|I′|
I′ = π
v−u
Ju+1,vK · π
|I|
I
≥
(
π̃v−u[λ1,v] ·
√
d
(v−u) log v−u
v−λ1
)
·
∏
i<t
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
·
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
≥
(
π̃v−u[λ1,v] · π
|I1|
Jv+1,α2K
·
√
d
(v−u) log v−u
v−λ1
+|I1|·log δ1
)
·
t−1
∏
i=2
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
·
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
≥
(
π̃
v−u+|I1|
[λ1,α2]
·
√
d
(v−u+|I1|) log v−u+|I1|α2−λ1
)
·
t−1
∏
i=2
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
·
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
,
If v−u+|I1|α2 >
|I2|
α3−α2 , we conclude as in the first step, puttingt
′ = t, α′1 = 1, α
′
k = αk for k ≥ 2,
δ′1 = (v − u + |I1|)/α2, δ′k = δk for k ≥ 2. If this is not the case, we letλ2 be such that:
v − u + |I1|
α2 − λ2
= δ2 =
v − u + |I ∩ Jα1 + 1, α3K|
α3 − λ2
.
Notice that sinceδ1 =
v−u+|I1|
α2−λ1 > δ2, we haveλ2 < λ1. A similar sequence of inequalities, using
Lemma 5 to relatẽπ[λ1,α2] to π̃[λ2,α2], leads to the following lower bound onπ
|I′|
I′ :
(
π̃
v−u+|I∩Jα1+1,α3K|
[λ2,α3]
·
√
d
(v−u+|I∩Jα1+1,α3K|) log v−u+|I∩Jα1+1,α3K|α3−λ2
)
·
t−1
∏
i=3
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
·
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
We can proceed in the same way, constructingλ2 > λ3 > . . .. Suppose first that the construction
stops at some point. We have:
π
|I′|
I′ ≥
(
π
|I′∩J1,αk+1K|
J1,αk+1K
·
√
d
|I′∩J1,αk+1K| log
|I′∩J1,αk+1K|
αk+1
)
·
t−1
∏
i=k+1
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
.
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We can then conclude, by puttingt′ = t − k + 1, α′1 = 1, α′j = αj+k−1 for j > 1, δ′1 = |I ′ ∩
J1, αk+1K |/αk+1, δ′j = δj+k−1 for j > 1.
Otherwise, we end up with:
π
|I′|
I′ ≥ π̃
|I′|
[λt−2,αt−1]
·
√
d
|I′| log |I
′∩J1,αt−1K|
αt−1−λt−2 ,
to which we can apply Lemma 5 to obtainπ|I
′|
I′ ≥ π
|I′|
J1,αt−1K
·
√
d
|I′| log |I
′∩J1,αt−1K|
αt−1 , which is again in
the desired form, witht′ = 2, α′1 = 1, α
′
2 = αt−1, δ
′
1 =
|I′∩J1,αt−1K|
αt−1
2
Theorem 3 now follows from successive applications of Lemma6, as follows:
Proof of Theorem 3.Lemma 6 gives us, by induction on the size of the considered set I, that for all
I ⊂ J1, dK, we have:
π
|I|
I ≥
∏
i<t
(
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
·
√
d
|Ii| log δi)
,
whereIi = I ∩ Jαi + 1, αi+1K, and the integerst and αi’s, and the densitiesδi = |Ii|αi+1−αi sat-
isfy t ≥ 1, 0 = α1 < α2 < . . . < αt ≤ d and1 ≥ δ1 > . . . > δt−1 > 0. By using Lemma 3
with ∆:=
√
d, ki:= |Ii| anddi:=αi+1 − αi, we immediately obtain:
π
|I|
I ≥
(√
d
|I| log |I|
αt−α1
)
·
(
∏
i<t
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
)
.
For convenience, we defineδt = 0. Because of the definition of theαi’s, we have:
∏
i<t
π
|Ii|
Jαi+1,αi+1K
=
∏
i<t
(
π
αi+1−αi
Jαi+1,αi+1K
)δi
=
∏
i<t
∏
i≤j<t
(
π
αi+1−αi
Jαi+1,αi+1K
)δj−δj+1
=
∏
j<t


∏
i≤j
π
αi+1−αi
Jαi+1,αi+1K


δj−δj+1
=
∏
j<t
(
π
αj+1
J1,αj+1K
)δj−δj+1
.
By usingt− 1 times Minkowski’s theorem, we obtain that:
π
|I|
I ≥
√
d
|I| log |I|
d · (‖b1‖/
√
d)
∑
j<t αj+1(δj−δj+1)
≥
√
d
|I| log |I|
d · (‖b1‖/
√
d)
∑
j<t(αj+1−αj)δj
≥
√
d
|I|
(
log |I|
d
−1
)
· ‖b1‖|I|.
The final inequality of the theorem is just the fact thatx 7→ x log(d/x) is maximal forx = d/e.
2
Note that ifmax I < d, we can apply the result to the HKZ-reduced basis(b1, . . . , bmax I). In the
case whereI = {i}, we recover the result of [23] that
‖b∗i ‖ ≥ (
√
i)− log i−1 · ‖b1‖. (2)
Still, our result is significantly better to what would have been obtained by combining several relations
of the type of Equation (2), when|I| grows large. For instance, for a worst case of our analysis whereI
is roughly the interval[d(1 − 1/e), d], this strategy would yield a lower bound of the form‖b1‖d/e ·√
d
(d/e) log d
, which is worse than Helfrich’s analysis.
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5 CVP and Other Related Problems
In this section, we describe what can be obtained by adaptingour technique to the Closest Vector
Problem and other problems related to strong lattice reduction. We only describe the proofs at a high
level, since they are relatively straightforward.
In CVP, we are given a basis(b1, . . . , bd) and a target vectort, and we look for a lattice vector that
is closest tot. The first step of Kannan’s CVP algorithm is to HKZ-reduce thebi’s. Then one adapts
the enumeration algorithm of Figure 1 for CVP. For the sake ofsimplicity, we assume that‖b∗1‖ is the
largest of the‖b∗i ‖’s (we refer to Kannan’s proof [16] for the general case). By using Babai’s nearest
hyperplane algorithm [6], we see that there is a lattice vector b at distance less than
√
d · ‖b1‖ of
the target vectort. As a consequence, if we takeA = d · ‖b1‖ in the adaptation of the enumeration
procedure, we are sure to find a solution. The analysis then reduces (at the level of Equation (1)) to
bound the ratio ‖b1‖
d
∏
i≤d ‖b∗i ‖
, which can be done with Minkowski’s theorem.
Theorem 4. Given a basis(b1, . . . , bd) and a target vectort, all of them inRn and with integer
coordinates whose absolute values are smaller than someB, one can find all vectors in the lattice
spanned by thebi’s that are closest tot in deterministic timeP(log B,n) · dd/2+o(d).
The best deterministic complexity bound previously known for this problem wasP(log B,n) ·
dd+o(d) (see [13,7]). Our result can also be adapted to enumerating all vectors of a lattice that are of
length below a prescribed bound, which is in particular usefl in the context of computing lattice theta
series.
Another important consequence of our analysis is a significat worst-case bound improvement of
Schnorr’s block-based strategy [23] to compute relativelyshort vectors. More precisely, if we take the
bounds given in [10] for the quality of Schnorr’s semi-2k reduction and for the transference reduction,
we obtain the table of Figure 3. Each entry of the table gives th upper bound of the quantity ‖b1‖
(det L)1/d
which is reachable for a computational effort of2t, for t growing to infinity. To sum up, the mul-
tiplicative exponent constant is divided bye ≈ 2.7. The table upper bounds can be adapted to the
quantity ‖b1‖λ1(L) by squaring them.
Semi-2k reduction Transference reduction
Using Helfrich’s complexity bound <∼ 2
log 2
2
d log2 t
t ≈ 20.347
d log2 t
t <∼ 2
1
4
d log2 t
t ≈ 20.250
d log2 t
t
Using the improved complexity bound<∼ 2
log 2
2e
d log2 t
t ≈ 20.128
d log2 t
t <∼ 2
1
4e
d log2 t
t ≈ 20.092
d log2 t
t
Fig. 3. Worst-case bounds for block-based reduction algorithms.
Let us finish by mentioning that work under progress seems to show, by using a technique due to
Ajtai [3], that our analyses are sharp, in the sense that for all ε > 0, we can build HKZ-reduced bases
for which the number of steps of Kannan’s algorithm would be of the order ofdd(
1
2e
−ε).
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Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the result by induction onk.For k = 1, the bound easily follows fromγd ≤ (d + 4)/4.
Suppose now that the result holds for somek ∈ J1, d − 2K, and that we want to show that it holds
for k+1. Notice that we can suppose thatd ≥ 3. DefineGd(k) = 12 log d log dd−k . Then for anyλ > 0,
Gd(k + λ)−Gd(k) = −
1
2
log d log
d− k − λ
d− k ≥
1
2
λ log d
d− k .
Takingλ = 1, we see thatGd(k + 1)−Gd(k) ≥ 12
log d
d−k .
From the upper boundγd ≤ (d + 4)/4, we obtain:
log Γd(k + 1)− log Γd(k) =
1
2
log γd−k
d− k − 1 ≤
1
2
log(d− k + 4)/4
d− k − 1 .
RR n° 6186
16 Guillaume Hanrot, Damien Stehlé
Now, since the sequence
(
n log((n+4)/4)
n−1
)
n≥2
is increasing, we have:
(d− k) log((d− k + 4)/4)
d− k − 1 ≤
d− 1
d− 2 log((d + 3)/4)
= log d +
(d− 1) log((d + 3)/4) − (d− 2) log d
d− 2
≤ log d,
since the last term is a decreasing function ofd, which is negative ford = 3. 2
Proof of Lemma 3
We have− log
∏
i≤t δ
−ki log kidi = (log δ) ·
∑
i≤t ki log
ki
di
. Now, note that the functionx 7→ x log x is
convex on[0,+∞). This means that for anyt ≥ 1, for anya1, . . . , at > 0, and for anyλ1, . . . , λt ∈
[0, 1] such that
∑
i≤t λi = 1, we have:
∑
i≤t
λiai log ai ≥


∑
i≤t
λiai

 log


∑
i≤t
λiai

 .
In particular, forλi:=
di
∑
i≤t di
andai:=
ki
di
, we get (after multiplication by
∑
i≤t di):
− log
∏
i≤t
δ
−ki log kidi ≥ (log δ) ·


∑
i≤t
ki

 log
(
∑
i≤t ki
∑
i≤t di
)
,
which is exactly− log δ−(
∑
i≤t ki) log
∑
i≤t ki
∑
i≤t di . 2
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. We start with the first identity. We prove it by induction onk. Fork = 1, this is Minkowski’s
bound. Assume it to be true for a givenk ≤ d − 2. We are to prove that it holds fork + 1 instead
of k. By applying Minkowski’s bound to the(d − k)-dimensional HKZ-reduced basisb∗k+1, . . . , b∗d,
we have:
‖b∗k+1‖ ≤
√
γd−k
d−k
d−k−1 · πJk+2,dK. (3)
We can rewrite our induction hypothesis as
π
k+1
k
J1,k+1K · ‖b
∗
k+1‖−
1
k ≤ (Γd(k))
d
k · π
d−k−1
d−k
Jk+2,dK · ‖b
∗
k+1‖
1
d−k ,
or, again, as
π
k+1
k
J1,k+1K ≤ (Γd(k))
d
k · π
d−k−1
d−k
Jk+2,dK · ‖b
∗
k+1‖
d
k(d−k) .
This gives, by using Equation (3):
π
k+1
k
J1,k+1K ≤ (Γd(k))
d
k · √γd−k
d
k(d−k−1) · π
k+1
k
Jk+2,dK = (Γd(k + 1))
d
k · π(k+1)/kJk+2,dK .
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By raising this last identity to the powerkk+1 , we get
πJ1,k+1K ≤ (Γd(k + 1))
d
k+1 · πJk+2,dK,
which, by induction, yields the first inequality.
The second inequality follows easily from the first one. Indee , it suffices to raise the first one
to the powerk/d, multiply both sides by
(
πJk+1,dK
)(d−k)/d
, and use the identitydet L =
(
πJ1,kK
)k ·
(
πJk+1,dK
)d−k
.
Proof of Lemma 5.
First notice that, as a consequence of Lemma 4, we have, fork l integers,1 ≤ k ≤ l < d,
πJl+1,dK ≥ Γd−k(l − k)−1 · πJk+1,dK. (4)
Recall that:
π̃[x1,d] =
(
πJ⌊x1⌋,dK
)λ1 ·
(
πJ⌊x1⌋+1,dK
)1−λ1 and π̃[x2,d] =
(
πJ⌊x2⌋,dK
)λ2 ·
(
πJ⌊x2⌋+1,dK
)1−λ2 ,
with λi =
(d−⌊xi⌋+1)(1−xi+⌊xi⌋)
d−xi+1 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Notice that sincex1 < x2, either⌊x1⌋+ 1 ≤ ⌊x2⌋, or
⌊x1⌋ = ⌊x2⌋. In the last case, since the functionx 7→ (u− x)/(v − x) is decreasing whenu < v and
for x < u, we must haveλ2 < λ1.
We split the proof in several cases, depending on the respective values ofλ1 andλ2.
First case:λ1 ≤ λ2. In that case, we have⌊x1⌋+ 1 ≤ ⌊x2⌋. We define
G := Γd−⌊x1⌋+1(⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋)λ1 · Γd−⌊x1⌋(⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋ − 1)λ2−λ1 · Γd−⌊x1⌋(⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋)1−λ2 .
By using three times Equation (4), we get:
π̃[x2,d] =
(
πJ⌊x2⌋,dK
)λ2 ·
(
πJ⌊x2⌋+1,dK
)1−λ2
≥
(
πJ⌊x2⌋,dK
)λ1 ·
(
πJ⌊x2⌋,dK
)λ2−λ1 ·
(
πJ⌊x2⌋+1,dK
)1−λ2
≥ G−1 ·
(
πJ⌊x1⌋,dK
)λ1 ·
(
πJ⌊x1⌋+1,dK
)1−λ1 .
Now, Lemma 4 gives that
log G
log
√
d
≤ λ1 log
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+ (λ2 − λ1) log
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+ (1− λ2) log
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− ⌊x2⌋
,
which, by concavity of the functionx 7→ log x, is at most the logarithm of
E(x1, x2) := λ1
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+ (λ2 − λ1)
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+ (1− λ2)
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− ⌊x2⌋
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To complete the proof of this first case, it suffices to prove that E(x1, x2) ≤ fracd− x1d− x2. We
have
E(x1, x2) =
λ1
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− x2 + 1
=
d− x1
d− x2
+
λ1
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
− 1− frac(x1)
d− x2 + 1
− x2 − x1
(d− x2)(d − x2 + 1)
,
≤ d− x1
d− x2
+
1
d− x2 + 1
(
λ1 − (1− frac(x1))−
x2 − x1
d− x2
)
=
d− x1
d− x2
+
1
d− x2 + 1
(
(1− frac(x1))frac(x1)
d− x1 + 1
− x2 − x1
d− x2
)
≤ d− x1
d− x2
+
1
d− x2 + 1
(
1− frac(x1)
d− x2
− x2 − x1
d− x2
)
,
from which the result follows at once, since⌊x1⌋ < ⌊x2⌋ implies thatx2 − x1 = ⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋ +
frac(x2)− frac(x1) ≥ 1− frac(x1).
Second case:λ1 > λ2. Similarly, defining
H = Γd−⌊x1⌋+1(⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋)λ2 · Γd−⌊x1⌋+1(⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋+ 1)λ1−λ2 · Γd−⌊x1⌋(⌊x2⌋ − ⌊x1⌋)1−λ1 ,
we obtain
π̃[x2,d] =
(
πJ⌊x2⌋,dK
)λ2 ·
(
πJ⌊x2⌋+1,dK
)1−λ2
=
(
πJ⌊x2⌋,dK
)λ2 (πJ⌊x2⌋+1,dK
)λ1−λ2 (πJ⌊x2⌋+1,dK
)1−λ1
≥ H−1
(
piJ⌊x1⌋,dK
)λ1 (πJ⌊x1⌋+1,dK
)1−λ1 .
Lemma 4 gives us that:
log H
log
√
d
≤ λ2 log
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+ (λ1 − λ2) log
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
d− ⌊x2⌋
+ (1− λ1) log
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− ⌊x2⌋
.
By concavity of the functionx 7→ log x, the right hand side is at most the logarithm of
λ2
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
d− ⌊x2⌋+ 1
+ (λ1 − λ2)
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
d− ⌊x2⌋
+ (1 − λ1)
d− ⌊x1⌋
d− ⌊x2⌋
= E(x1, x2) +
λ1 − λ2
(d− ⌊x2⌋)(d − ⌊x2⌋+ 1)
.
Hence, we just need to prove that:
E′(x1, x2) := E(x1, x2) +
(λ1 − λ2)
(d− ⌊x2⌋)(d − ⌊x2⌋+ 1)
≤ d− x1
d− x2
.
Some elementary calculus provides the equalities:
E′(x1, x2) =
d− x1
d− x2
+
λ1
d− ⌊x2⌋
− 1− frac(x2)
(d− ⌊x2⌋)(d− x2 + 1)
− 1− frac(x1)
d− x2 + 1
− x2 − x1
(d− x2)(d− x2 + 1)
=
d− x1
d− x2
+
λ1
d− ⌊x2⌋
− 1− frac(x1)
d− x2
− 1− frac(x2)
(d− ⌊x2⌋)(d− x2 + 1)
− x2 − ⌊x1⌋ − 1
(d− x2)(d− x2 + 1)
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Second case, first sub-case:λ1 > λ2, ⌊x1⌋ < ⌊x2⌋. In that case,
E′(x1, x2)−
d− x1
d− x2
≤ λ1 − (1− frac(x1))
d− x2
− 1− frac(x2)
(d− ⌊x2⌋)(d − x2 + 1)
− 1
(d− x2)(d− x2 + 1)
≤ 1− frac(x1)
(d− x2)(d − x1 + 1)
− 1
(d− x2)(d− x2 + 1)
≤ 0
Second case, second sub-case:λ1 > λ2, ⌊x1⌋ = ⌊x2⌋. In that case, after some rewriting which can
be checked with one’s favourite computer algebra system, one finds that:
E′(x1, x2)−
d− x1
d− x2
=
1
(d− ⌊x1⌋)(d − x2)
(
(1− frac(x1))(x1 − x2)(d − ⌊x2⌋)
d− x1 + 1
− frac(x2)(λ1 − λ2)
d− ⌊x1⌋+ 1
)
≤ 0.
2
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